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Abstract—This survey is an integrated view of other surveys on
privacy preserving for data integration. First, we review the database
context and challenges and research questions. Second, we formu-
late the privacy problems for schema matching and data matching.
Next, we introduce the elements of privacy models. Then, we sum-
marize the existing privacy techniques and the analysis (proofs) of
privacy guarantees. Finally, we describe the privacy frameworks and
their applications.
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Database Context and Challenges
Data integration: Data need to be collected from disparate
data sites and integrated while sanitizing privacy-sensitive
information.
There are some challenges:
• The data are protected by legitimate and widespread
privacy concerns. Companies are afraid of being ex-
ploied by competitors or antitrust concerns.
• The data need to be integrated consistently while
preserving privacy information.
Data integration has been a long standing challenge for
the database community. This need has become critical in
numerous contexts, including integrating data on the Web
and at enterprises, building e- commerce market places,
sharing data for scientific research, data exchange at gov-
ernment agencies, monitoring health crises, and improving
homeland security.
Unfortunately, data integration and sharing are hampered
by legitimate and widespread privacy concerns. Companies
could exchange information to boost productivity, but are
prevented by fear of being exploited by competitors or
antitrust concerns.
Peer Data Management System (PDMS) This provides
the extent to the classical data integration approach on
large-scale network. The problem involves exchange data
while passing through several intermediate peers. The map-
pings used in a PDMS have two main purposes: query
translation and result translation.
There are some challenges:
• Preserving the privacy of the exchanged data while
passing through several intermediate peers.
• Protecting the mappings used for data translation.
• Protecting the privacy without being unfair to any of
the peers
Real-life systems include: Hyperion, PeerDB, BestPeer.
Federated Database System. Nowadays, there are a
wide range of applications involving information access
across databases (information sources) owned by different
organizations. The most two common approaches to ac-
complish this are solutions offered in the area of federated
databases and solutions employing mediators.
Federated database systems implement one-to-one con-
nections between all pairs of databases that need to talk to
each other. These connections allow one database system
(requester) to query another database system (processor) in
terms that the query can be interpreted correctly.
When mediator-based systems are used to support infor-
mation access across heterogeneous databases, a mediator
trusted by E1 and E2 generates and stores a mapping
between the schemas of D1 and D2 to resolve the semantic
heterogeneity. Essentially, mediators know data schemas.
There are some challenges:
• Federated database systems inherently require that D1
and D2 reveal their data schema (and the associated
semantics), a main type of metadata, to each other.
However, this requirement may raise serious privacy
concerns when “there is an increasing need for sharing
in- formation across autonomous organizations in such
a way that no information apart from the answer to the
query is revealed”.
• Although a privacy control policy can be enforced by
the mediators, such a solution has to rely on fully
trusted and highly secure mediators to preserve the
privacy and confidentiality of metadata. And such an
approach is not (very) practical, since (a) building
a highly secure mediator is not only very expensive
but also very difficult, if not impossi- ble, because
almost every host providing services could be hacked;
(b) from the trust management point of view, such a
continuous high trust requirement is very difficult to be
satisfied, and as a result, such a mediator (third party)
is unlikely to be deployed. (Fundamentally, the more
trust you assume, the more vulnerable the system.)
Nevertheless, the above discussion shows that preserv-
ing the privacy of metadata while enabling semantic
interoperation is a diffi- cult problem, since, often,
the technologies proposed for en- abling semantic
interoperation depend heavily on insecure mediation
based on the metadata.
Many applications require users from one organization
to access data belonging to another organizations. Sharing
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tions due to privacy concerns. For example, organizations
like FBI and CIA may never want to reveal their metadata
and divulge crucial information about what information
is stored in their sources. Moreover, storing the schema
on more systems obviously increases the threat to the
confidentiality of the schema.
Data Mining: Works in privacy-preserving distributed
data mining have studied how to train and apply classifiers
across disparate datasets without revealing sensitive infor-
mation at the datasets.
In this context, it is assumed that data integration (in-
cluding record linkage) has already been done.
1.2 Provision Questions
There are many issues raised by database community:
1) How can we develop a privacy framework for data
integration that is flexible and clear to the end users?
This is first mentioned in [2] as a standard to build
a privacy policy inside data integration system. In-
dividual organizations may define their own policies
to address their customers needs. The problems are
exacerbated in a federated environment. The task of
data integration itself poses risks, as revealing even the
presence of data items at a site may violate privacy.
2) All privacy views and policies must result in a single
piece of privacy metadata? In [2], the authors sug-
gested that the privacy policies could be enforced by
the server holding the data. As a subsequent, every
data item leaving the server should be annotated with
privacy metadata expressing the privacy policies that
have to be applied. These annotations travel with the
data, and are preserved and perhaps modified when
the data is integrated with data from other sources or
transformed.
In the context of data integration among multiple data
sources, query execution becomes much harder. It is
not obvious how to retain a set of privacy views/poli-
cies in a single piece of privacy metadata (or in a
single, multiple encrypted data instance).
3) How can we develop schema matching solutions that
do not expose the source data and schemas? In [2], the
authors pointed out that all current existing matching
algorithms, however, assume that sources can freely
share their data and schemas, and hence are unsuitable.
4) How can we match entities and con- solidate informa-
tion about them across sources, without revealing the
origin of the sources or the real-world origin of the
entities?
2 PRIVACY PROBLEMS
2.1 Privacy-Preserving Schema Matching
In [2], to develop matching algorithms that preserve privacy,
first the following components need to be developed:
2.1.1 Matchings Construction/Prediction
Statement. To create correspondences (instance matching
or schema matching) without revealing data values, or even
the schemas.
Solutions. Some solutions have been proposed:
• Learning-based schema matching. The idea is that
one or more classifiers (e.g., decision tree, Naive
Bayes, SVM, etc.) are trained at source S (by data
instances or schema attributes of T), then sent over to
target T for classification (on data instances or schema
attributes of T). In some cases, we also perform
in reverse direction (from T to S) to combine both
classification results. Finally, the classification results
are used to construct a similarity matrix between all
attributes of S and T.
• Pair-wise Mutual Information. In [3], the authors
proposed a protocol called ”privacy-preserving schema
matching using mutual information”.
Assumptions. Different schemas in the same domain
have similar probability distribution of attributes and
mutual information (MI) capturing the correlation be-
tween attributes.
Method. Match MIs of two schemas using private
set intersection and return intersected elements only.
The mutual information between two attributes is a
measure of the amount of information (e.g., entropy)
that each attribute contains about the other attribute.
Pros. Simple and direct with only two participants.
Effective in many practical scenarios where schemas
only differ in attributes’ name and have highly similar
structure.
Cons. Two parties must join the protocol which relies
on a reliable channel (in case of failure, might restart
again).
• Privacy preserving mediator. When mediator-based
systems are used to support information access across
heterogeneous databases 3, a mediator trusted by E1
and E2 generates and stores a mapping be- tween the
schemas of D1 and D2 to resolve the semantic hetero-
geneity. Essentially, mediators know data schemas.
Implementations. PACT framework [12] is the pio-
neer in this approach.
Pros. Flexible and Light-weight. The participants need
not to know the implementation and it reduces the
overhead cost incurred at each data source.
Cons. Although a privacy control policy can be en-
forced by the mediators, such a solution has to rely on
fully trusted and highly secure mediators to preserve
the privacy and confidentiality of metadata. And such
an approach is not (very) practical, since (a) building a
highly secure mediator is not only very expensive but
also very difficult, if not impossible, because almost
every host providing services could be hacked; (b)
from the trust management point of view, such a
continuous high trust requirement is very difficult to
be satisfied, and as a result, such a mediator (third
party) is unlikely to be deployed.
32.1.2 Human Verification of Matches
Statement. The goal is to give (untrusted) users enough in-
formation to validate or repair low-quality correspondences,
while preserving the privacy (data instances, schema struc-
ture, etc.) of involving data sources.
Solutions. There are some solutions:
• Sample Data Values. One way to achieve this can
be randomly selecting some values for particular at-
tributes and show the user only these values. It can be
argued that revealing only few attribute values does
not reveal anything useful about the characteristics
(distribution, structure,. . . ).
• Relevant Attributes. Another way is construct a small
context by showing the user only relevant attributes/-
correspondences.
Pros. Users need not to be trusted.
Cons. Firstly, a measure for privacy loss is needed in
this context. Secondly, the verification should not be
performed on all correspondences to avoid inferring
attack by combination of multiple observations.
2.2 Privacy Preserving Data Matching
2.2.1 Record matching
This is a sub problem of data integration, mentioned in [17]
(SIGMOD 2007).
Statements. There are two parties P and Q giving their
relations RP and RQ to be matched. After the matching
process, P only obtains the matching set PMatch related
to RP and Q only know the records of the matching set
QMatch related to RQ.
Solutions. Secure Data Matching and Secure Schema
Matching proposed in [17]. The authors designed a pro-
tocol using a third party to perform record matching. The
matching result is obtain by mapping records to a vector
space to preserve the privacy of data sources.
• Pros. Automated matching without revealing records
or attributes. The quality of matching is also guaran-
teed with a good computational performance.
• Cons. Needs 3 parties (two main-players and one
mediator) that must be semi-honest (participating in
protocol but can arbitrarily perform information infer-
ence). Hard to implement due to distributed nature of
protocol which requires a reliable channel and strongly
coupling code.
2.2.2 Record linkage (Data Instance)
In data integration and sharing, the record linkage problem
is mentioned in [2]. Record linkage can be viewed as
a pattern classification problem. In pattern classification
problems, the goal is to correctly assign patterns to one
of a finite number of classes.
Statement. The goal of the record linkage problem is to
determine the matching status (this is abstract definition)
of a pair of records brought together for comparison.
We need solutions for the following sub problems:
• Privacy-preserving record linkage: that is discov-
ering the records that represent the same real world
entity from two integrated databases each of which is
protected (en- crypted or anonymized). In other words,
records are matched without having their identity
revealed.
• Record linkage aware data protection: that is pro-
tecting the data, before sharing, using anonymization
techniques that are aware of the possible use of
record linkage, with public available data, to reveal
the identity of the records.
• Online record linkage: linking records that arrive
continuously in a stream. Real-time systems and sen-
sor networks are two examples of applications that
need online data analysis, cleaning, and mining.
2.3 Privacy Preserving Querying
2.3.1 Querying Across Sources
Statement. Once semantic correspondences have been es-
tablished, it is possible to query (e.g., with SQL queries)
across the sources. How do we ensure that query results do
not violate privacy policy? How do we query the sources
such that only the results are disclosed? How can we
prevent the leaking of information from answering a set
of queries?
Solutions. In [2], only a few general techniques exist
today for querying datasets while preserving privacy:
• Statistical databases
• privacy-preserving join computation
• privacy-preserving top-K queries
3 PRIVACY SETTINGS
3.1 Privacy Objects
There are various kinds of object to be protected in privacy
preserving system/framework.
Data: cover all concrete data in database systems, in-
cluding healthcare data, consumer data, personal data etc.
The service customer learns only the answer to the query,
and not any of the data used to compute it.
Record: The information in data sources (database, file
system, computer resources, etc.) that represents the real
world entity. This is the main concern in data matching
[17]. In some contexts, a record can be interpreted as data
instance (a set of all tuples about an entity).
Schemas/Metadata. when performing schema matching,
we need to protect the schema of two data sources. Protect-
ing schema means that we do not reveal a certain degree
(or number) of attributes of schema or completely hide
information (name, structure, . . . ) of schema attributes.
Matchings. The mappings (between schema attributes or
data values) used for data translation need to be protected to
avoid revealing involving information and inferring attacks.
Queries. The service provider does not learn the query,
only that a query was performed against a particular users
information.
Anonymous communications. Service customers and
service providers do not know who the opposite party is.
43.2 Privacy Concepts
Privacy is addressed today by preventing dissemination
rather than integrating privacy constraints into the data
sharing process. Privacy-preserving integration and sharing
of research data in health sciences has become crucial to
enabling scientific discovery.
HIPAA ”Safe Harbor” De-Identification of Medical
Record Information requires that each of the concerned
identifiers of the individual or of relatives, employers, or
household members of the individual must be removed
from medical record information in order for the records to
be considered de-identified.
Most privacy laws balance benefit vs. risk: access is
allowed when there is adequate benefit resulting from
access. An example is the European Community directive
on data protection which allows processing of private data
in situations where specific conditions are met.
Privacy Views. Each privacy view specifies a set of pri-
vate attributes and an owner. By definition, data that appears
in some privacy view is considered private; otherwise it is
not private. A simple example of a privacy view is given
below:
PRIVACY−VIEW p a t i e n t A d d r e s s D o b
OWNER P a t i e n t . p i d
SELECT P a t i e n t . a d d r e s s , P a t i e n t . dob
FROM P a t i e n t
This privacy view specifies that a patients address and
dob (date-of-birth) are considered private data when oc-
curring together. Similar definitions are possible for fields
that specify “individually identifiable information”: Sets of
attributes that can be used to tie a tuple or a set of tuples in
a data source to a specific real-world entity (e.g., a person).
Privacy views could be implemented by a privacy mon-
itor that checks every data item being retrieved from the
database and detects if it contains items that have been
defined as private. There are two approaches: compile-
time (based on query containment) and run-time (based on
materializing the privacy views and building indices on the
private attributes). Both approaches need to be investigated
and tradeoffs evaluated.
Privacy Policies (Access Control Policies). The
database administrator can decide which policy applies to
each view. More precisely, a policy defines the accessibility
of private data for a specific or any beneficiary. Privacy
policies can be enforced by the server holding the data: data
items will be shared only if the purpose statement of the
requester (see below) satisfies the policy. But, in addition,
every data item leaving the server should be annotated
with privacy metadata expressing the privacy policies that
have to be applied. These annotations travel with the data,
and are preserved and perhaps modified when the data is
integrated with data from other sources or transformed.
Example:
PRIVACY−POLICY i n d i v i d u a l D a t a
ALLOW−ACCESS−TO y
FROM Consen t x , p a t i e n t A d d r e s s D o b y
WHERE x . p i d = y . owner and x . t y p e = ’ yes ’
BENEFICIARY y . owner
Purpose Statements. A flexible language is required in
which applications can state the purpose of their action, and
explicitly mention the beneficiary.
3.3 Datasets
Healthcare. In [2], the authors use healthcare scientific data
as a leading example.
FBI and CIA. used in [12]. In FBI and CIA databases,
each table contains 50 to 10000 records depending on its
functionality, and the corresponding access control rules
are stored in a separate authorization table. The authors
designed the organizational ontology for each organization.
Each ontology has about 20 classes and about 300 triples if
they are represented in N-TRIPLE format. Each organiza-
tion has 5 roles. Each role has different privileges to access
the tables in database.
PET. In [12], we use a dataset obtained from a pet
hospital chain to conduct our experiments. The original data
set includes information about the demographics of pets,
their hospital visits, diagnosed diseases, lab tests, prescribed
medications, etc. The dataset contains information about
over 45 million pets with hospitals spanning 40 US states.
For the sake of the experiments, we modified the data set
as follows. First, we partitioned the data based on the state
information to obtain 40 different dataset partitions. Sec-
ond, for each partition, we mapped the data into a smaller
schema, similar to the ones shown in Figure 1, thus keeping
only the pet medication information. We assumed that each
partition represents the database of a peer in the network.
In particular, we used six such partitions representing six
different states. Table 2 shows some statistics about these
dataset partitions.
CENSUS. Used in [19]. (downloadable from
http://www.ipums.org), containing personal informa-
tion of 50K individuals with 8 dimensions (average
domain size 28.1).
ADULT. Used in [19]. containing personal information
of 32,561 individuals with 15 dimensions (average domain
size 1476.4).
Three datasets. Used in [17], consists of British
Columbia voters, personal data by a public administration,
and business data owned by a public administration.
4 PRIVACY TECHNIQUES
This sections describes core preserving privacy techniques
that are used to protect privacy objects (as described
in 3.1). Table 1 provides the summary of privacy techniques
mentioned on PPP, PD protocol and PACT framework.
4.1 K-Protection
K-Protection is the technique used for protecting query
results from unauthorized parties in PDMS setting. It allows
the client (user) to determine the privacy level (k value) that
5Fig. 1: Execution of PPP with k = 2. The messages between peers
are: (1) S → C: query result in the context of S. (2) S → T:
mapping request. (3) T → C: encrypted mappings. (4) C → T:
double-encrypted mapping. (5) encrypted mapping that can be
decrypted by C
means the untrusted parties cannot have certainty of each
value of the query result greater than 1/k.
The definition of k-protection is described in [4] as
follows:
Definition 1: (k-protection) Let RX , DX , URX be the
query answer, domain of the query answer, and the set
of unique values in the query answer respectively in the
context of X . Let R(pi;X) be the information observed
by the peer X during the execution of the protocol pi. A
protocol pi is said to provide k-protection if for each Ti,
i ∈ [1, t]Pr[v ∈ RTi |R(pi, Ti)] ≤ 1
k
for all v ∈ DTi .
Example 1: Figure 1 shows a simple example of PPP
Protocol [4] with one client C, one server S, one translator
T and k-protection = 2. Assume the answer of query from
client C has only one value AD (in the server’s schema).
Before passing the query result to the translator T, the server
S inserts an additional fake value to the result LC to make a
mapping request (Step 2). Therefore, the translator cannot
determine whether AD or LC is the real result with the
probability exceeds 1/2.
4.2 Schema Obfuscation
While K-Protection is designed to protect the query result at
server-side, Schema Obfuscation on the other hand is used
to preserve the privacy of the client’s schema. When a query
is issued by the user, the query is transformed based on the
user ontology instead of the client’s schema. Therefore the
client’s schema will be kept private.
Example 2: Figure 2 illustrates two ontology of FBI and
CIA database. Assume we have a meta-data that indicates
the ontology term staff corresponds with the database
table-name adminpersonnel. To obtain information from
FBI database, an user at CIA issues a query:
select fname, lname, compensation from
adminpersonnel where compensation > 70000;
This query is automatically ”obfuscated” by using CIA’s
ontology. PACT replace table-name adminpersonnel
by ontology class staff , and the schema terms
fname, lname, compensation by ontology terms
fistName, lastName, pay, respectively. The re-written
query now is:
Fig. 2
select fistName, lastName, pay from staff where
pay > 70000;
4.3 Data Encryption
One straight forward method is used to protect privacy
is encryption. Encryption is commonly collaborated with
other techniques to enhance privacy. The reason is that the
techniques such as k-protection, schema obfuscation are de-
signed to protect a particular kind of data. Consequently, the
remaining vulnerable information could easily be secured
by using encryption. Therefore, the object of encryption can
be all privacy objects (as described in ??) such as mappings,
query or result. Furthermore, since the purpose is to aid
other techniques the implementation of encryption depends
on the design of the protocol or framework. In what follows
we will describe some encryption implementations in some
protocol and framework.
4.3.1 PPP Protocol [4]
PPP protocol only encrypt translator mappings to fulfil
fairness requirement (i.e.; only result-related mappings can
be showed to the client). The institution behind this re-
quirement is to access the translator’s mapping may cost
money. Consequently, it is may be unfair if the client must
pay for useless mappings. Besides of that, the translator
must not know what mapping the client selected to request.
To solve these problems, PPP uses commutative encryption
technique to encrypt mapping.
Figure 1 shows an example of PPP protocol where
translator’s mappings are encrypted (only the an-
swer of mapping) then send to the client C along
with the query result received from the server S
(Step 3), here LC → ET (”Lung Cancer”) and
AD → ET (”AIDS”). The commutative encryption
(EC(ET (M)) = ET (EC(M))) allows the client get de-
crypted answer by sending the double-encrypted request
EC(ET (”Lung Cancer”)) to the translator then get back
the result EC(”Lung Cancer”) after the translator applies
decryption.
4.3.2 PD protocol [19]
PD protocol works on the same setting as PPP protocol
but uses oblivious transfer to replace for commutative
encryption due to its security problems. Oblivious transfer
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(OT) [] is a probabilistic approach to allow the client
retrieve mappings without letting the translator know what
mapping the client chosen.
A simple example of PD protocol is shown in Figure
3. The right part each mapping entry is encrypted by a
special encryption function that key is depend on the left
part. To get the final result, the client encrypt result received
from the server AD (Step 1) then send mapping request
EC(AD) to the translator (Step 2). The special designed
of the encryption algorithm ET (EC(x)) = EC(K(x))
allow the translator send back the key of selected entry
mapping EC(K(AD)) without knowing the content of
request together with translator mapping table (Step 3).
From these information, the client can obtain the correct
mapping AD → AIDS from the mapping table.
4.3.3 PACT [12]
Whereas the translator in PPP and PD protocol is trusted
(i.e.; the client and server share their schemas with trans-
lators), the mediator in PACT setting is untrusted. Conse-
quently, the schemas and mappings are sensitive informa-
tion and need to be protected. To resolve this problem, both
mappings and client query are encrypted.
Mapping encryption: Mappings are created by experts
and encrypted in off-line processing phase. Note that these
mappings are ontology mappings.
Example 3: Here are some simple examples based on
ontology of FBI and CIA database as illustrated in Figure
2:
• (EKFBI (employee), EKCIA (manager), subClassOf)
• (EKFBI (employee), EKCIA (staff), subClassOf)
• (EKFBI (employee).EKFBI (salary), EKCIA
(manager).EKCIA (comp))
• (EKFBI (employee).EKFBI (salary), EKCIA
(staff).EKCIA (pay))
• (EKFBI (Name), Merge(EKCIA (fisrtName), EKCIA
(lastName))
Query encryption: In parallel, a query will be encrypted
using two keys: (a) the client master key; and (b) a pre-
determined session key (denoted KS) between the client
and the server.
Example 4: Continue with CIA and FBI databases set-
ting, to obtain information from CIA database, an user at
FBI poses a query:
select name, salary from employee where salary >
70000;
All ontology terms (e.g., employee and salary) in the
query is encrypted by using FBIs master key, denoted
KFBI , and all the values (i.e., 70000) in the query is
encrypted by using the session key KS .
The encrypted query:
select EKFBI (name), EKFBI (salary) from
EKFBI (employee) where EKFBI (salary) >
EKS (70000).
The final query after applying mapping tables as shown
in Example 3:
select Merge(EKCIA(firstName), EKCIA(lastName)),
EKCIA(comp) from EKCIA(manager) where
EKCIA(comp) > EKS (70000);
union
select Merge(EKCIA(firstName), EKCIA(lastName)),
EKCIA(pay) from EKCIA(staff) where EKCIA(pay) >
EKS (70000);
Technique PPP PD PACT
K-protection
√ √
Schema Obfuscation
√
Data Encryption
√ √ √
TABLE 1: Privacy techniques
5 PRIVACY ANALYSIS
5.1 Parameters
The experiments often show performance results in the
impact of following parameters:
• Result data size
• The number of users
• The number of access control rules
5.2 Metrics
Privacy Disclosure. In [2], the authors suggested to con-
sider reliable metrics for quantifying privacy loss. In the
original definition H(y) corresponds to entropy of y, and
Hx(y) corresponds to conditional entropy of y given x then
privacy loss due to revelation of x is given as follows:
Infer(x→ y) = H(y)−Hx(y)
H(y)
(1)
Security Elements. analyzed in [17] in terms of disclo-
sure of participated parties, including:
• length of database records
• database size
• set of matching records
• set of matching attributes
• number of matching attributes
Processing Performance. mostly concern about query
performance of the database system in the presence of
privacy-preserving techniques. Somes to be mentioned:
• End-To-End Response Time
• Component Throughput
• Matching Time: the computational time to obtain
matching result.
7Query Selectivity.
Matching Quality. reflects the quality of schema or data
matching results when privacy techniques are applied. In
most cases, they simply use precision and recall. A good
technique is expected to produce high quality matching
while maintaining a high level of privacy.
5.3 Types of Attack
In [4], the author discuss seven type of attacks against the
protocol in e case of a malicious model, where peers may
deviate from the protocol to launch attacks against other
peers. The first four attacks are related to the privacy of
the query result, while the following three attacks related
to the privacy of the mapping tables.
5.3.1 Query Replay Attack
In a query replay attack, if the same query was issued
several times by the same or different clients to the same
server S, and passing through the same translator T, then
T may attempt to learn more information about the result,
each time the query is issued.
Solution: insert same noise for the same query result
to prevent attackers from inferring the intersection of two
different query results.
5.3.2 Known Result Attack
In this attack, a translator T may send queries to S whose
results are already known to T, in an attempt to learn how
S selects noise values.
Solution: One approach might be increasing the k-value
when an attribute is queried several times (greater than
pre-defined threshold). Thus, the probability of retrieving
complete noise data is very low.
5.3.3 Privacy Relaxation Attack
A translator Th, h ∈ [1, n] may attempt to reduce the k-
value of k-protection before forwarding the query to Th+1,
Hence, Th can illegitimately relax the privacy requirement
set by C.
Solution: the client C sends raw query (based on client
schema) and k-value ( of k-protection) directly to the server
S and not to any translator. Moreover, every translator Th
sends to S the attribute name mappings it used for translat-
ing the query. However, establishing the direct connection
might incurs huge workload and resource consuming.
5.3.4 Translators Collusion Attack
In this attack, several translators may collude together in
an attempt to gain additional knowledge about the result.
For example, in PPP protocol some translator can collect
all their received mapping requests that contain query result
and noise in a central location for extracting real result from
noise.
Solution: Use encryption or ensure k-protection for all
data passing through translator.
5.3.5 Mappings Correlation Attack
In this attack, the client may want to infer other mappings
by correlating two consecutive response message from two
translators Th+1 and Th. For example, in PD protocol,
with two sequential response message such as (x1 →
ETh(y1), x2 → ETh(y2) and (y1 → ETh+1(z1), y2 →
ETh+1(z2)). The client can easily infer the mappings (x1 →
y1, x2 → y2) because of the order of message is preserved
through translators.
Solution:
• Randomly shuffled mapping request message (con-
tained query result & required mappings for translat-
ing) before passing to next translator.
• Encrypt translators’ mappings then break key into
multiple pieces, each piece send to each translator.
5.3.6 Rick Client Attack
In this attack, a rich client C may decide to purchase all
the mapping entries from a certain translator T. This way,
it can clone T and provide the same translation services,
which T previously offered. Thus, T can be deprived from
potential future revenues.
Solution: Add rule to term of services or customer
agreement when providing mappings.
5.3.7 Black Market Attack
This attack refers to the situation where clients choose to
form a black market to exchange mapping entries and thus
negatively impact the revenues of the translators.
Solution: No solution yet.
6 PRIVACY FRAMEWORKS
6.1 General Privacy Middlewares (both client-
server and P2P context)
Care Middleware by Pareschi. Implemented some tech-
niques:
• Anonimity
• Obfuscation
• Policy
• Cryptography
AnonySense by Kapadia. Implemented some tech-
niques:
• Anonymity
• Obfuscation
• Cryptography
6.2 Peer Data Management System (PDBMS)
There are a wide range of real-life systems:
PeerDB. PeerDB is a P2P distributed data sharing sys-
tem, which supports fine grained content-based searching
and does not rely on a shared schema. It employs informa-
tion retrieval approaches, such as keyword search, to find
peers having data relevant to the users query. It also uses
mobile agents to be able to perform operations at peer sites.
8coDB. coDB is another P2P database system with tech-
niques for searching and updating peer databases. In coDB,
mappings are defined in terms of GLAV coordination rules.
Piazza. Introduced by Halevy et al, Piazza PDMS ad-
dresses the problems of defining a language for schema
mappings, reformulating queries based on these mappings
and automating the schema matching process in order to
assist the user in constructing the mappings.
Piazza is a Peer Data Management System (PDMS). Un-
like Hyperion, it does not support value-to-value mappings..
It uses more complex schema mappings. In particular,
Piazzas mapping language supports both Local-As-View
(LAV) and Global-As-View (GAV) mapping types.
Hyperion. Hyperion is a Peer Data Management System
(PDMS). The mappings used in a PDMS have two main
purposes: query translation and result translation. For query
translation, different types of mappings were proposed.
The Hyperion system is based on the notion of mapping
tables, which encompass attribute-to-attribute and value-to-
value mappings.
HePToX. the HePToX PDMS was introduced primarily
for XML sources. In HePToX, mapping rules between peers
can be inferred given simple correspondences between their
schema elements. The rules are expressed using a language
called TreeLog, which can handle data-metadata mappings.
This whole body of work did not consider the security
issues in PDMSs.
6.3 Privacy Preserving Protocol
In [4], the authors presented a novel query answering
protocol deployed on top of the Hyperion system. The
proposed protocol has two specific goals: (1) hiding the
identity of the real values in the query result as they pass
through the intermediate translator peers, and (2) ensuring
that no mapping entries other than the ones needed to
translate the query result get disclosed to the client. Recall
that if the second goal is not met, then the protocol will be
unfair.
The PPP operates in three phases:
Phase I. Query Delivery
Phase II. Result and Mappings Collection
Phase III. Mappings Decryption and Result Translation
6.4 Light-weight privacy preserving protocol
In [19], we stick to the strict requirement that no party
can observe the mappings of other peers and develop two
lightweight protocols: a simple method based on serial
translation and a more complex one that supports parallel
translation. Furthermore, we consider a stronger adversary
model where there may be collusions among peers and
propose an efficient protocol that guards against collusions.
We conduct an experimental study on the performance
of the proposed protocols using both real and synthetic
data. The results show that the proposed protocols not only
achieve a better privacy guarantee than PPP, but they are
also significantly more efficient, because they do not rely
on expensive cryptographic operations.
6.5 PACT
Privacy-preserving Access Control Toolkit (PACT), pro-
posed by [12], is a novel solution that enables privacy-
preserving secure semantic access control and allows shar-
ing of data among heterogeneous databases without hav-
ing to share metadata. PACT uses encrypted ontologies,
encrypted ontology-mapping tables and conversion func-
tions, encrypted role hierarchies and encrypted queries.
The encrypted results of queries are sent directly from the
responding system to the requesting system, bypassing the
mediator to further improve the security of the system.
PACT provides semantic access control using ontologies
and semantically expanded authorization tables at the me-
diator. One of the distinguishing features of the PACT is
that it requires very little changes to underlying databases.
Despite using encrypted queries and encrypted mediation,
PACT provides acceptable performance.
PACT focuses on metadata instead of data; and PACT
focuses on information access instead of information inte-
gration.
PACT has two phases: (i) the offline phase - the initial
processing that takes place before any query is processed;
and (ii) the online phase, which shows how an inter-
organization query is processed in runtime.
The offline procedure of PACT is to (1) translate the
(syntactic) access control policy of each organization to
a semantic access control policy against the organizations
ontology, and (2) prepare the other metadata used by the
mediator.
The online procedure of PACT consists of following
steps:
Step 1. Schema Obfuscation and Query Encryption
Step 2. SQL Query Parsing.
Step 3. Encrypted Query Rewriting
Step 4. Semantic Access Control
Step 5. Semantic to Syntactic Query Translation
Step 6. Query Evaluation
Step 7. Returning the Results
6.6 Privacy Preserving Ontology Matching
Framework
This framework originates from 2005 in the AAAI work-
shop on Context and Ontologies. In [11], the authors
proposed a framework for interoperation systems, which
leverage two privacy-preserving ontology matching algo-
rithms:
Automated. This algorithm enables interoperation
(querying) between two organizations A and B. The map-
ping rules used for interoperation are created by automated
ontology matchers and stored at the mediator in a mediated
system.
• Assumptions: Use mediator to store mapping rules.
The mediator is untrusted (it cannot know the key to
decrypt the queries and mapping rules). The ontology
matcher operates on encrypted ontologies only. Two
organizations should trust each other.
9• Methodology: Queries are encrypted by a symmetric
private key used only by A and B (KA−B). Mapping
rules are also encrypted by KA−B . Ontologies are also
encrypted. The encrypted mapping rules are created
by using work similarity matching technique on a
encrypted dictionary.
• Pros: Fast and simple. Word-based matcher and sym-
metric encryption are trivially implemented.
• Cons: Firstly, the matching quality might be poor
due to the lack of human verification (human experts
cannot decipher encrypted ontologies). Secondly, two
organizations use the same private key. Thus, one
organization can interfere the communication between
the mediator and the other organization to obtain the
other’s ontology.
Semi-automated. This algorithm extends the automated
algorithm with human-involving in matching process and
asymmetric encryption for two organizations.
• Assumptions: Use asymmetric encryption system: each
organization own a unique private key and publicize
the public key to certified authority. Human expert
has access to clear-text ontologies for semi-automated
ontology matching.
• Methodology: Firstly, each organization sends its on-
tology encrypted by session key (Ks) to the expert.
The expert use Ks to decrypt two ontologies and per-
form matching. Then the mapping rules are encrypted
by public key: the terms of ontology A and B are
encrypted by public keys KA and KB respectively.
Finally, the encrypted mapping rules are stored at the
mediator. When interoperating via the mediator, the
queries and ontologies of each organization are en-
crypted by its public key. The mediator will rewritten
the queries based on encrypted mapping rules.
• Pros: Two organizations do not need to trust each
other. Semi-automated process can leverage other
matching techniques (structural, pattern, inference,
etc.) since the clear-text ontologies are accessible by
the expert.
• Cons: The human expert must be trusted.
6.7 Secure Set Intersection Protocols for Data
and Schema Matching
The first protocol is introduced in [17] (SIGMOD 2007) to
perform secure data matching and schema matching. The
principle is that by embedding the records into a vector
space, any information about the records is hidden from
the matching process. This idea is similar to learning-based
schema matching which relies on a classifier to build the
similarity matrix.
Assumptions. Three parties (two players and one media-
tor) are semi-honest (following protocol but might inferring
information). Two main players have different privacy re-
quirements also at schema level.
Methodology. The protocol consists of three main
phases: (1) setting of the embedding space, (2) embedding
of relations RP and RQ values and (3) comparison to
decide matching records. For the sake of simplicity, we
list some main privacy techniques:
• At some steps, two main parties use symmetric key
encryption to prevent the mediator from seeing the
plain name of schema attributes.
• Use threshold, set intersection and vector concept
to embed the similarity of matching records into
normalized distance between vectors. Thus does not
reveal any information about data records and schema
attributes.
The second protocol proposed in [3] does not require the
third party (mediator) in the protocol. The authors proved
that their privacy-preserving schema matching protocol is
secure against malicious adversaries for three mapping
types: one-to-one, onto and partial. One of the building
blocks of their protocol is the privacy-preserving set inter-
section scheme. In the case where all the attribute entropies
in one of the schemas are different from one another, the
protocol executes a linear number of privacy-preserving set
intersections.
6.8 Service Broker Architecture
In [1], the authors proposed a privacy preserving framework
that leverages a service broker to process queries without
revealing any useful information to the data sources or to
the third parties. The broker is assumed to be secure and
fully trusted to safeguard the privacy of organisational data.
The service broker is responsible for both the query execu-
tion as well as the decision of determining which queries
should be permitted for execution. The broker ensures that
results of the query do not contain any information that
the asker is not authorized to discover. The broker uses
an algorithm called semantic request mediation based on
global ontology to translate customer queries so that the
semantic heterogeneity between organisation A’s schema
and N’s schema can be resolved.
6.9 Secure Multi Party Computation (SMC)
SMC is a generative tool in cryptography. It is employed by
several works on privacy issues in data mining. Oblivious
transfer is also a SMC protocol (specifically, secure two-
party computation).
Generally speaking, each party i in SMC has its own
input xi and the parties want to cooperate to calculate
f(x1, ..., xn) without any party i learning anything beyond
f(x1, ..., xn) and its own input xi.
6.10 Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
PIR does not protect the mappings of the translators. For
example, PIR allows the client to see the whole mapping
table in plaintext, which is undesired in our problem. In
oblivious transfer, the client learns Mσ only.
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7 RELATED WORK
Some of the privacy issues have been addressed for the case
of a single database manage- ment system in Hippocratic
Databases. Other privacy issues have been addressed for the
case of a single interaction between a user and a Website in
the P3P standard. None of the current techniques address
privacy concerns when data is exchanged between multiple
organizations, and transformed and integrated with other
data sources.
8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This survey is an integrated view of other surveys on
privacy preserving for data integration. Interested readers
can follow the references pin-pointed in this survey for
further investigation. While the survey is intended for data
integration [5], [13], [6], [14], many privacy models and
techniques can be applied in other fields, such as informa-
tion retrieval [18], [16], data mining, sensor network [8],
[7], and crowdsourcing [10], [15], [9].
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